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Imagine you have a daughter inflicted with severe combined
immunodeficiency disease ("SCID") who will have to be kept away
from all bacteria and viruses in the environment because she does
not have a functioning immune system. Your daughter's quality of
life is tremendously diminished from that of other children, who
can do simple things like play outside. Then along comes a
breakthrough known as gene therapy,' where scientists can alter
your child's genes, allowing her to be able to create her own
immune cells and lead a normal life. Just before your daughter is
to begin experimental human trials, the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") halts all gene therapy trials because a
competing firm failed to follow safety protocols. You later learn
The Author would like to thank Professors Edward Rock and Arti Rai, Ruchi
Verma, Cristina Carvajal, and Christian Shaw for their helpful remarks and
criticisms of this Comment.
1 Gene therapy is "[a]n experimental procedure aimed at replacing,
manipulating, or supplementing nonfunctional or misfunctioning genes with
healthy genes." Human Genome Project Information, Genome Glossary, at
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human Genome/ glossary/ glossary-g.
shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). A gene is "[t]he fundamental physical and
functional unit of heredity. A gene is an ordered sequence of nucleotides located
in a particular position on a particular chromosome that encodes a specific
functional product (i.e., a protein or RNA molecule)." Id.
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that this firm was only conducting research because antitrust
regulators forced the biotechnology firm which was going to
produce your daughter's therapy to offer compulsory, reasonably
priced licenses to the rival firm. Your daughter's hopes of living a
normal life have now been dashed because of the greed of a few
researchers.
Many people have a life-threatening genetic defect with no
proven cure. Modem science has progressed such that somatic cell
genetic manipulations2 can be performed on many of these
individuals, giving them hope of leading a normal life.
Concurrently, the biopharmaceutical industry3 is seeing a rapid
increase in vertical integration, in the form of strategic
alliances/joint ventures, patent pools, and mergers, designed to
alleviate high transaction costs. As this consolidation continues,
regulatory agencies in the United States and the European Union
have become aware of antitrust concerns that arise from such
concentrations of market power.
In the instances where vertical integrations have been
approved, antitrust agencies often require compulsory, reasonably
priced licenses be available to competitors in order to prevent
monopolistic practices. Antitrust regulators have failed to
recognize the conflicts of interest prevalent in the
biopharmaceutical industry generally and the gene therapy
industry specifically. These conflicts incentivize researchers to
violate safety procedures, and if any adverse effects result, the
FDA will halt all similar gene therapy trials, even those of the
original licensor. By forcing the integrating firm/licensor to bear
the externalities of the licensees, antitrust regulators are harming
gene therapy patients, interfering with the free market system, and
inadvertently limiting incentives for innovation.
Lost in the antitrust analysis conducted by the regulatory
agencies are the end user's issues and concerns regarding access to
2 "In somatic gene therapy the recipient's genome is changed, but the change
is not passed along to the next generation." James M. Wilson, Human Gene
Therapy: Present and Future, 10 HuM. GENOME NEws 15, 15 (1999) available at
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/publicat/hgn/vlOnl
/hgnl0l_2.pdf.
3 The biopharmaceutical industry is the combination of the pharmaceutical
industry and the biotechnology industry. The biopharmaceutical industry has a
global impact and is of great importance because "[elconomies... [may realize]
long-term benefits from biotechnology." JOHN E. SMrTH, BIOTECHNOLOGY 6 (3d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1981).
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these invaluable treatments. If all gene therapy trials in a
particular research area are halted (because of failures to follow
safety procedures, not because there is no scientific efficacy in the
research), gene therapy patients will suffer. Therefore, antitrust
regulators should continue requiring compulsory licenses.
However, they should effect this by allowing the licensor to pre-
approve all licensees' experimental procedures in order to limit
improprieties by the licensees and subsequent clinical halts of gene
therapy trials by the FDA.
To understand the gene therapy industry, it is necessary to
understand the larger biopharmaceutical industry, of which the
gene therapy industry is a subgroup. Section 2 of this Comment
provides background information on the gene therapy and
biopharmaceutical industries. Section 3 examines the current
allocation of property rights, high transaction costs, and creation of
the anticommons problem. Section 4 explains the rationale for
vertical integration in the biopharmaceutical industry. This Section
also describes the three major forms of vertical integration in the
biopharmaceutical industry: strategic alliances, patent pools, and
mergers. Section 5 explains the antitrust analysis of vertical
integration by both American and European antitrust regulators.
Section 6 examines the compulsory licensing doctrines of both the
United States and Europe. The Section also discusses compulsory
licensing schemes required for patent pool and merger approvals.
Section 7 discusses the controversial innovation market analysis
conducted by antitrust agencies when reviewing industries
dependent on research and development ("R&D") such as the gene
therapy industry, and uses the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger as
an example. Section 8 analyzes the harm of compulsory licensing
to both gene therapy patients and the integrating firms. This
Section addresses the increase in gene therapy trials, discusses the
recent FDA halts of gene therapy experiments, and describes a
possible solution to mitigate the harm to gene therapy patients and
licensing firms.
This Comment concludes, in Section 9, that antitrust regulators
should grant vertically integrating firms, forced to license their
technology, the right to pre-approve and monitor safety
procedures of its licensees. The licensors should be able to pre-
approve the experimental design and protocols used by the
licensee in an effort to curb potential safety violations that will not
only harm the licensee, but also the licensor. In addition, the
2004]
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licensor should be permitted to monitor its licensees to ensure they
are continually following safety protocols.
2. BACKGROUND OF GENE THERAPY
2.1. Gene Therapy
Many diseases are the result of defective genes or their
respective gene products. 4 These diseases may be treated, cured, or
modified via gene therapy.5 Gene therapy is a process by which a
patient's expressed genetic information or deoxyribonucleic acid
("DNA")6 is modified by inserting the correct necessary genetic
information.7 The two primary types of gene therapy are germ line
gene therapy and somatic cell gene therapy.8
Germ line gene therapy modifies the DNA in the reproductive
cells (sperm and egg) of an organism, so that the genetic
modifications will be transferred to the next generation.9 This is a
controversial issue and is still many years away from effective
implementation. 0 Somatic cell gene therapy strives to modify the
4 See definition of a gene, supra note 1.
5 Diseases that may be prevented by gene therapy include: cancer, human
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV"), severe combined immunodeficiency disease
("SCID"), cystic fibrosis, and Epstein-Bar virus ("EBV") to name a few. See
generally Gene Therapy Clinical Trials, J. GENE MED., at http://www.wiley.co.uk
/genetherapy/clinical/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2004) (compiling data on diseases
addressed by gene therapy clinical trials worldwide).
6 DNA is the fundamental building block for genes. "DNA is the prime
genetic molecule, carrying all the hereditary information." JAMES D. WATSON ET
AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 240 (4th ed. 1987).
7 Human Genome Project Information, Gene Therapy, at http://www.
ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/medicine/genetherapy.shtml (last
visited Jan. 24, 2004).
8 See SMITH, supra note 3, at 221-22 (explaining the two types of gene therapy).
9 Germ line gene therapy is "[an experimental process of inserting genes into
germ cells or fertilized eggs to cause a genetic change that can be passed on to
offspring." Genome Glossary, supra note 1; see also BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL.,
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 1128 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that germ line
cells are the cells "from which the next generation of gametes [cells that fuse and
proliferate to create another organism] will be derived").
10 Of the two forms, somatic cell gene therapy is more promising because
research is currently being conducted regarding its therapeutic purposes. See
Wilson, supra note 2 ("Germ line gene therapy is not being actively investigated,
at least in larger animals and humans, although a lot of discussion is being
conducted about its value and desirability."); see also SMITH, supra note 3, at 222




2004] ANTITRUST AND GENE THERAPY 387
DNA of non-reproductive cells; these changes are not passed to an
organism's offspring." Even though somatic cell gene therapy is
still very experimental, it is the more promising form of gene
therapy and the focus of this Comment.
2.2. Formation of the Biopharmaceutical Industry
A simple structural background of the biopharmaceutical
industry is needed to understand the current landscape in gene
therapy. Genetic therapies, like other drugs, are created by both
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, collectively known
as the biopharmaceutical industry.12
In the 1970s and 1980s, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries were relatively independent and conducted very
different types of initial research. 13 Biotechnology companies often
conducted research using genetic, proteomic, or bioinformatics
data14 in contrast to pharmaceutical companies that often
conducted research with small protein libraries.
15
Today, however, instead of using small libraries of proteins for
research, pharmaceutical companies are expanding into the
traditional realm of biotechnology firms and using genetic and
proteomic data to conduct research. 16 Due to this increased use,
the importance of genetic and proteomic data is growing, but this
information is often owned by biotechnology companies.
17
11 Wilson, supra note 2; see also ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1128
(explaining that somatic cells, "which form the rest of the body [not including the
gametes] ... ultimately leave no progeny").
12 Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 814 (2001).
13 Id. at 815-16.
14 Proteomics is the "effort to identify and characterize all of the proteins
encoded in an organism's genome, including their posttranslational
modifications." ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 489. Bioinformatics can be defined
as the use of computers to design and apply methods for the collection,
organization, indexing, storage, and analysis of biological genetic sequences and
proteins. Network Science, Terms and Definitions in Bioinformatics, at http://
www.netsci.org/Science/Bioinform/terms.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2004).
15 See Rai, supra note 12, at 815-16 (explaining the history and direct functions
of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the 1970s and 1980s). See
generally From Sequence to Sales, The Genomics Payoff, MED AD NEWS, July 1, 2000
(providing anecdotal evidence by the President of Gene Logic, a large
biotechnology company).
16 See Rai, supra note 12, at 816 ("[Allmost all pharmaceutical research is
based on genetic or proteomic information.").
17 Id.
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Therefore, to gain access to genetic and proteomic information,
pharmaceutical companies must negotiate with biotechnology
companies that hold patents on this information.18 Oftentimes,
instead of negotiating with the biotechnology firms for the use of
this information, pharmaceutical companies have attempted
vertical integrations19 in the form of strategic alliances and
mergers.20 Much of the vertical integration in the biotechnology
and pharmaceutical industries is occurring because of the high
transaction costs associated with licensing negotiations, addressed
in Section 3 of this Comment. The line between biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies is becoming increasingly blurred, thus
creating the biopharmaceutical industry.
2.3. Biopharmaceutical Industry Business Model
Biopharmaceutical companies, like most firms, are dependent
on creating and selling a product. In the case of biopharmaceutical
companies, the product is a marketable drug. The first step in the
biopharmaceutical business model is to obtain a potential drug
product, which is done through basic research.21  The basic
research may be conducted in-house, by acquiring a research
license from a biotechnology firm, or by merging with a
biotechnology firm and acquiring all of its proprietary research
rights.22 The potential drug candidate is then developed and
18 See id. ("Because this [proteomic and genetic] information is often owned
by biotechnology companies, pharmaceutical companies now need to work quite
closely with biotechnology companies.").
19 A relationship is said to be "vertical" when it involves two firms who
are in a buyer-seller relationship, or when it eliminates such a
relationship. For example, a vertical merger occurs when a firm acquires
another firm with whom it could otherwise have a buyer-seller
relationship ....
Vertical "integration" occurs whenever vertically related firms make
relatively long term arrangements for the provision.. .of some
"input"....
1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 20.1, at 20-2 (2002)
[hereinafter 1 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST].
20 Rai, supra note 12, at 817-18.
21 Sean Nicholson, Lecture at University of Pennsylvania Law School (Nov.
18, 2002) [hereinafter Nicholson] (discussing the motivation and impact of
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manufactured, which is where the experience of large
pharmaceutical companies in developing drugs, assisting in
obtaining regulatory approval, and manufacturing plays a leading
role. 23 The last major step in the business model involves the
commercialization of the drug candidate, which includes
marketing, sales, and distribution.24 Pharmaceutical companies are
experts in commercializing drugs, and this comparative advantage
is the reason why many biotechnology companies have the
incentive to form strategic alliances with pharmaceutical
companies.
25
3. CURRENT ALLOCATION OF PATENT RIGHTS, HIGH TRANSACTION
COSTS AND THE ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM
There are high transaction costs in the biopharmaceutical
industry for two main reasons: (1) too many fragmented,
concurrent, upstream intellectual property rights holders; and (2)
inhibitive stacking licenses and reach-through licensing
agreements ("RTLAs").26
It is common for multiple biotechnology companies to obtain
intellectual property rights on concurrent research or fragments of
the same research. While biotechnology companies were busy
obtaining early patents on genetic and proteomic research, often
resulting in overlapping rights, they overlooked the creation of
immense transaction costs for future downstream development
and commercialization, which created an upstream "patent




26 An RTLA gives owners of "upstream" inventions rights in discoveries or
developments made by downstream licensees/developers. Professors Heller and
Eisenberg use DuPont's licensing scheme as an example of an RTLA. DuPont had
licensed research tools with terms requiring licensees to obtain its approval before
commercializing new discoveries, which "permit[ted] DuPont to leverage its
proprietary position in upstream research tools into a broad veto right over
downstream research.. .and product development." Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699-700 (1998).
27 A "patent thicket" is an accumulation of upstream patent rights by
disparate, individual patent holders. A patent thicket poses high transaction costs
for any downstream developer who requires licenses from all the upstream patent
holders to continue development because any one patent holder may hold out for
a higher, supracompetitive price. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
2004]
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research, the developer will have to individually negotiate with all
upstream patent holders. The existence of the patent thicket will
disincentivize the downstream developer from conducting the
research, and innovation in the market place is lessened. This is
known as the "tragedy of the anticommons." 28
One reason that there are multiple upstream patent holders is
because Congress promulgated the Patent and Trademark Act
Amendments of 1980, also referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act.29 The
Bayh-Dole Act has changed the landscape of intellectual property
rights by incentivizing universities that conduct federally funded
research to obtain patents on their research.30 The result is that
universities now patent as much technology and research as
possible, and the number of patents issued to U.S. universities has
risen from approximately 250 per year in the early 1970s, to 3079 in
1999.31 Because there are more university-owned patents,
increasing the number of total patent holders with disparate goals
that affects the biopharmaceutical industry, downstream
developers may have to negotiate with them before conducting
research.32 The increase in university-owned patents has helped
ECONOMY 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
28 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 698-99 (explaining that the
proliferation of intellectual property rights will lead to an under use of scarce
resources because too many owners can block all use).
29 Bayh-Doyle Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
30 Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab:
Law, Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39
AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 195-200 (2002) ("[T]he role of the research university in the
national innovation system has changed significantly. Universities now patent far
more technology than they did a generation ago ... .
31 Id. at 196.
32 See Rai, supra note 12, at 847 (arguing that the historic heterogeneity of
actors in the biopharmaceutical industry, including "academic institutions,
upstream biotechnology companies, and downstream pharmaceutical
companies," increases the difficulties in overcoming the transaction cost problem
by inhibiting the formation of patent pools).
[U]niversities have become important commercial actors in markets for
technology. Although universities continue to generate a [sic] vast
amounts of research that is not at all connected to industry-university
partnerships, a significant share of university research is now developed
in collaborative relationships wherein universities have become - to
varying degrees and in many different forms - the business partners of
private firms.
See Newberg & Dunn, supra note 30, at 197.
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create high licensing transaction costs in the biopharmaceutical
industry and further hinders downstream development, despite
the original intentions of the Bayh-Dole Act legislators.
33
Another reason there are extremely high transaction costs in
the biopharmaceutical industry is because of the use of stacking
licenses and reach through licensing agreements.
Stacking licenses occur when a downstream developer obtains
a license from an upstream right holder.34 Then, this developer
licenses the right to another downstream developer, creating a
two-tier level of licenses.35 Stacking licenses are prevalent in
upstream research tools and generate large transaction costs.
RTLAs allow an upstream patent holder to gain intellectual
property rights on subsequent downstream research.36  Any
potential downstream developers will have to give up rights,
perhaps royalties on sales, of their downstream discoveries, thus
creating high transaction costs.
37
A severe anticommons problem may arise if multiple RTLAs
38
are combined with stacking licenses that overlap and are
inconsistent, resulting in extremely large transaction costs.
33 The legislative history pertaining to the Bayh-Dole Act explains the
impetus for creating the Act.
Federal agencies are not as successful in delivering new products and
inventions to the marketplace as the private sector. The result is that the
public is not receiving the full benefits of the research and development
efforts that it is supporting. It is in the public interest to see that new
discoveries are commercialized as quickly as possible without the
artificial restraints ....
See S. REP. No. 96-480, at 19 (1979).
34 See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55
STAN. L. REV. 303, 415-21 (2002) (discussing how stacking licenses "set up another
tollbooth on the road to product development" in the biopharmaceutical industry
(quoting Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 699)).
35 Id.
36 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 699 ("The use of [RTLAs] on
patented research tools illustrates another path by which an anticommons
[problem] may emerge."). Professors Heller and Eisenberg also point out that
RTLAs are becoming more common in upstream licensing agreements in the
biomedical research context. Id.
37 Id.
38 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 699 ("In effect, the use of
[multiple] RTLAs gives each upstream patent owner a continuing right to be
present at the bargaining table as a research project moves downstream toward
product development.").
20041
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4. HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS ALLEVIATED BY VERTICAL
INTEGRATION
4.1. Economic Rationale for Vertical Integration
A major reason why there is vertical integration in the
biopharmaceutical industry is that it alleviates transaction costs. 39
If a firm has a legal right or interest in the upstream research
because it is vertically integrated, then there is no need to
negotiate, which is the primary transaction cost in the
biopharmaceutical industry. This is why downstream drug
developers and pharmaceutical companies are seeking to alleviate
transaction costs by vertically integrating.
Even if there is only one upstream patent holder, transaction
costs exist and there may still be a need for vertical integration.
With only one upstream patent holder, pharmaceutical companies
may still conduct research on a pathway despite not having
permission to do so. Should a successful product result from the
research, the pharmaceutical company may then attempt to obtain
a license from the upstream patent holder before
commercialization and marketing. The advantage of this strategy
is that if no fruitful development occurs, the pharmaceutical
company will not have lost any money in acquiring the license.
The downside of this development strategy is that if a successful
development is made, there may be a holdup problem. The
upstream patent holder will now be able to prevent the
commercialization of the drug product and may demand
disproportionate or supracompetitive economic rents.
Therefore, even if there is only one upstream right holder, there
is an incentive for downstream developers to vertically integrate.
4.2. Types of Vertical Integration
To alleviate transaction costs, the biopharmaceutical industry
has seen an increase in vertical integration. 40 The primary forms of
39 According to Professors Sung and Pelto, the biotechnology industry in
particular would benefit from a reduction in transaction costs because transaction
costs funnel funds away from research and development, which slows down
innovation. See Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto, Greater Predictability May Result
in Patent Pools, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C2.
40 See David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in
Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 255, 255 (1999) ("The
pharmaceutical industry is in the midst of a wave of consolidation.").
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vertical integration in the biopharmaceutical industry include
strategic alliances/joint ventures, patent pools, 41 and mergers.
4.2.1. Strategic Alliances/Joint Ventures
Strategic alliances are a common form of vertical integration in
the biopharmaceutical industry.42 Not only do they mitigate
transaction costs, they are also a good source of capital investment
for biotechnology firms. For example, in 1998, biotechnology
companies raised $6.2 billion through strategic alliances with
pharmaceutical companies, which was three times as much as the
capital raised from public and private equity markets.
43
Typically, alliances are structured so that the companies share
responsibility in drug development. 44 Although strategic alliances
can be varied in structure, generally the biotechnology company is
given some form of compensation from the pharmaceutical firm in
exchange for the upstream research.45 The compensation often
takes the form of an equity investment, up-front cash, a milestone
payment, or a royalty scheme.46 The pharmaceutical company will
then use its expertise and infrastructure in marketing and
distribution to maximize sales of the final drug product.
47
41 There are currently no existing biotechnology patent pools, but they are
being widely discussed in academic literature. See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4-11 (2000) (discussing patent pools and their history)
[hereinafter USPTO], available at http: /www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/pac/dapp/
opla/patentpool.pdf; Rai, supra note 12, at 846-48 (discussing the difficulty with
which patent pools arise); Sara M. Biggers et al., Intellectual Property and Antitrust:
A Comparison of Evolution in the European Union and United States, 22 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 210-25 (1999) (discussing changing market dynamics
and impact on antitrust law).
42 See Nicholson, supra note 21 (discussing the prevalence of strategic
alliances).
43 Sean Nicholson et al., Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset
and Firm Quality (May 2003), at 1, available at http://hc.wharton.upenn.edu/
danzon/PDF%20Files/BioPharma%2OAlliancesDEALS2003.pdf ("For example,
in 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1998, when biotech stock prices were relatively low,
biotech companies raised more money from pharmaceutical alliances than from
all other sources combined.") (citation omitted).
44 See Nicholson, supra note 21 (explaining the structure of strategic alliances
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An example of a biopharmaceutical strategic alliance was the
Human Genome Sciences ("HGS") and SmithKline Beecham
("SmithKline") genetic platform deal in 1993. SmithKline, a large
pharmaceutical company, paid HGS $125 million over three years
for an eight percent ownership of the company in addition to
commercial rights to any genomics-based drugs or diagnostics it
creates. 48 The strategic alliance has given HGS credibility with
public investors in equity markets and has vaulted HGS's status to
one of the premier biotechnology firms, not to mention an
additional $77.5 million from milestones and other clauses. 49 The
alliance has also been beneficial for SmithKline as it has created a
drug pipeline and has defrayed $82.5 million from its initial $125
million investment.50
4.2.2. Patent Pools
Patent pools are another form of vertical integration and are
much less common than strategic alliances or mergers.51 A patent
pool is an agreement between two or more patent holders to
license their patents to third parties.52 A patent pool is also defined
as an agreement between multiple patent owners to aggregate
intellectual property rights or patents such that each member will
be subject to cross-licensing. 53 Patent pools are a response to "the
48 There were three exceptions: gene therapy, antisense, and bio-
transformation products were not included in the deal. Nicholson, supra note 21.
In October of 2000, SmithKline exercised its co-right option to jointly develop and
commercialize repifermin, a new growth factor discovered and developed by
HGS. Press Release, Human Genome Sciences, Human Genome Sciences and
SmithKline Beecham Agree to Jointly Develop and Commercialize Repifermin, an
HGS Product (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://www.hgsi.com/news/press/00-
10-16_SBrepifermin.htnl.
49 Nicholson, supra note 21.
50 Id.
51 Although patent pools are rare, in the last 150 years, many American
technological developments have occurred because of patent pool formation.
Some examples include the Sewing Machine Combination, Manufacturer's
Aircraft Association, Associated Radio Manufacturers, and the MPEG-2 patent
pool. See Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE
J. ON REG. 359, 373 (1999) ("Patent Pools have played a prominent part in the legal
and industrial history of the United States."); USPTO, supra note 41, at 4-5
(explaining the history of patent pools in the United States).
52 USPTO, supra note 41, at 4.
53 Id. (citing Joel I. Klein, An Address to the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, On the Subject of Cross-licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2,
1997), reprinted at http://www/usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm).
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lack of access to technology for the research and development of
commercial products."m Despite the lack of access to technology in
the biopharmaceutical industry, patent pools have yet to be
created, but that does not mean that one will not be formed in the
near future.55
Antitrust concerns often arise because there is a potential for
market abuse, manipulation, or collusion.56 Patent pools have both
pro- and anti-competitive effects, so antitrust agencies must
analyze them carefully to ensure that there are no violations.57
Although there are currently no biotechnology patent pools,
there are several potential benefits to their creation. The first
benefit is that a biotechnology patent pool will mitigate problems
created by blocking patents5 8 and stacking licenses.59 For example,
54 Id. at 2.
55 Note, Professor Rai has argued that patent pools are less likely to form in
the biopharmaceutical industry than other industries because members in the
biopharmaceutical industry do not have homogenous values and are not repeat
players, but noting that there are exceptions. Compare Arti K. Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U.L.
REV. 77, 133-35 (1999) (stating that "it is unlikely that collective exchange norms
will emerge spontaneously in the biotechnology industry"), with Rai, supra note
12, at 847 (arguing that "a patent pool might be formed in cases where multiple
patents are absolutely necessary to conduct basic research on a gene or a
particular disease").
56 Potential violations of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act are always a
concern, and after Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States 226 U.S. 20
(1912), patent pools were subject to antitrust laws. In Standard Sanitary, the
Supreme Court dissolved a price fixing patent pool that also excluded unlicensed
manufacturers. The 1995 DOJ/FTC Intellectual Property Licensing Guidelines
lists two potential anticompetitive consequences of patent pools: (1) patent pools
may be used as a mechanism for imposing a collective output or price restraint;
and (2) patent pools may be used for exclusionary purposes. U.S. Dep't of Justice
& Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property § 5.5, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCh) 13,132 (1995) [hereinafter IP
Guidelines], available at http://wwvw.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.
pdf.
57 Throughout the century, antitrust regulators have been concerned with the
higher likelihood of collusion through patent pools, which would violate the
Sherman Act. See Carlson, supra note 51, at 373-77 (discussing the history of
antitrust scrutiny of patent pools).
58 [A blocking patent is a situation] where the second-generation
inventor comes up with a patentable (that is, novel and non-obvious)
improvement on the first-generation invention. Although the second-
generation improvement is independently patentable, it nonetheless
incorporates the first-generation invention and therefore infringes the
first inventor's patent. In order to practice its improvement, the second-
generation inventor must therefore seek a license from the first-
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many patents on nucleic acids and messenger ribonucleic acids
("mRNA"s) 60 are granted. In addition, if patents on the proteins
coded by the nucleic acids are also granted, which often occurs, it
would create a blocking patent situation should either patent
holder want to develop their respective inventions further.61 If
there were a patent pool containing both patents, each patent
holder would be free to develop the technology, alleviating the
blocking patent problem, and third parties could more easily
obtain a license from the pool instead of two separate individuals,
solving the stacking licenses problem as well.62
The second benefit of a biotechnology patent pool is that it may
reduce needless litigation over licensing agreements, another type
of transaction cost.63 A third party interested in obtaining a license
will save time and money by getting it from a patent pool instead
of negotiating with each individual patent holder.64 This limits the
number of potential parties at the bargaining table, and hopefully
leads to a quicker, non-litigious resolution of licensing disputes. 65
generation inventor. (Conversely, if the first-generation inventor wants
to practice the improvement, it must seek a license from the improver.)
Ex post, it may be very difficult for such a licensing negotiation to go
forward.
Rai, supra note 12, at 833; see also Carlson, supra note 51, at 379 (defining blocking
patents as those "which have claims that overlap each other in a manner that the
invention claimed in one patent cannot be practiced without infringing the claims
of the other patent and vice versa").
59 See USPTO, supra note 41, at 8.
60 ALBERTS ET. AL, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining that mRNA, or messenger
ribonucleic acid, is a string of nucleic bases that are involved in the direct
synthesis of long strings of amino acids, or proteins).
61 USPTO, supra note 41, at 3 (discussing how patent rights can lead to
exclusion of downstream development).
62 Id.
63 Id.; see also Carlson, supra note 51, at 380 ("Rather than risk the time, cost,
and uncertainty of patent litigation, firms frequently choose to settle their
disputes through the creation of patent pools or cross-licensing arrangements.
This option may be especially attractive for smaller firms that do not have the
resources to litigate an infringement trial, and for patentees who fear that their
patents may be invalidated in court.") (footnotes omitted).
64 USPTO, supra note 41, at 9; see also Robert P. Merges, Institutions for
Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools 25 (August 1999)
(discussing the benefit of limiting the number of licensors from which a license
may be obtained), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt
/pubs/merges/pools.pdf (last visited, Mar. 13, 2003).
65 See USPTO, supra note 41, at 9 ("Without a patent pool, a company would
have to obtain licenses separately from each holder of the essential patents...
[and] it establishes a motivation for some patent owners to hold out on licensing
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The third benefit of a biotechnology patent pool is that it will
distribute risk to all of its members. 66 If a pool were designed so
that all of its members were to receive equal royalties from the
developed technologies, then each member would share the risk
and recover some, if not all, of its costs of research and
development.67 If all members in a patent pool have access to the
technology of the pool, it may improve the commercial potential of
any patented invention of a pool member.68
The fourth benefit of a biotechnology patent pool is that it
provides a formal setting for the exchange of technical
information. 69  Instead of relying on trade secrets, technical
information may be freely exchanged for the benefit of pool
members. By exchanging information, the pool may help limit
duplicative research, which is especially important to the
biotechnology industry.70
Given the many benefits of patent pools, it is clear that they
would likely be a solution to the problems plaguing the
biopharmaceutical industry.71 But, patent pools create antitrust
concerns, so American and European agencies must examine them
closely.
4.2.3. Mergers
Lastly, vertical integration may also take the form of a merger.
There have been many mergers in recent years and often they may
only include the purchase of a pipeline of drugs.72 The rationales
their patents.").
66 Id.
67 Id.; see also Carlson, supra note 51, at 381-82 ("Pooling spreads royalties
among the various firms that invest to produce a successful invention. The pools
increase the probability that each participant will recoup investments made in the
development of its respective technologies.") (footnotes omitted).
68 USPTO, supra note 41, at 8 (citing Sung & Pelto, supra note 39).
69 Id. at 10.
70 Id. (examining the benefits of institutional information exchange via a
patent pool).
71 But, critics have the following three major concerns of patent pools: that
they may inflate prices of competitive goods, shield invalid patents, and
encourage collusion or price fixing. USPTO, supra note 41, at 10-11. For a recent
example of Agency denial of a proposed pool, see Fed. Trade Comm'n, Analysis
of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment: Summit Technology Inc.,
[hereinafter Summit Technology Analysis], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1998/08/d09286ana.htm.
72 By purchasing a pipeline of drugs from a biotechnology company instead
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for formally merging two firms are often the same in the
biopharmaceutical industry as in any other, namely, economies of
scope, economies of scale, and exploiting synergies. But, in a
biopharmaceutical merger, the most important issue is the
retention of key scientists along with eliminating unnecessary
costs. 7 3
The largest biotechnology merger to date is Applied Molecular
Genetics Incorporated's ("Amgen") acquisition of Immunex
Corporation ("Immunex") in 2002. Amgen, a biotechnology
company, acquired Immunex, another biotechnology company, in
a $16 billion deal that was to result in synergy savings of $200
million in 2003 and approximately $250 million in 2004.74 Not only
did Amgen acquire the expertise Immunex possessed in
inflammation, immunology, oncology, and vascular biology, but it
also gained its blockbuster drug Enbrel with estimated sales of $3
billion by 2005.75
This merger was not between a biotechnology company and a
pharmaceutical company, but instead, is an example of the
increasing blurriness within the biopharmaceutical industry.
Amgen is known as a large biotechnology firm, but is also skilled
in traditional pharmaceutical areas such as drug development,
obtaining regulatory approval, marketing, and distribution.76
of purchasing the entire biotechnology company itself, pharmaceutical companies
do not take on the additional risks associated with the operational management of
the biotechnology company. They only take on the risks of the particular drug
pipeline. Nicholson, supra note 21; see also Balto & Mongoven, supra note 40, at
255-58 (explaining the merger wave in the pharmaceutical industry); Media
Release, The Boston Consulting Group, Biotechnology Mergers Expected to
Increase, BCG's Tollman Says: Success Depends on Sound Strategy Fit and
Effective Post Merger Integration Uune 11, 2002) [hereinafter BCG Media Release]
(observing that the "pharmaceutical industry is consolidating" and speculating
that biotechnology consolidation is also "highly likely"), available at http://
www.bcg.com/ media center/media press releases.sp?id=927.
73 See BCG Media Release, supra note 72 ("It is important to identify and
retain key capabilities and talent. For example, the loss of key scientists can be
devastating.").
74 Press Release, Amgen, Amgen to Acquire Immunex for $16 Billion in Stock
and Net Cash (Dec. 17, 2001), available at http://amgen.acquisitioninformation
.com/mediacenter/121701.html.
75 Id.
76 See id. (describing the strengths of the two firms and their respective
contributions to the merger).
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5. AGENCY ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST ISSUES77
5.1. Evolution of Cooperation between American and European
Antitrust Regulators
Robert Pitofsky, the former Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") once said, "[i]nternational joint ventures and
strategic alliances are almost as common today as interstate
alliances were 50 years ago." 78 Although, European and American
antitrust agencies have not always seen eye to eye, as the world
increasingly globalizes, there is an increasing need for regulators
on both sides of the Atlantic to collaborate and create similar, if not
uniform, antitrust policies for businesses to operate efficiently.
79
77 This Comment only discusses antitrust analysis of patent pools. Antitrust
analysis of strategic alliances/joint ventures and mergers is a lengthy endeavor
and beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed discussion of antitrust
analysis of strategic alliances/joint ventures, see 2 HERBERT HOvENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW §§ 36, 45 (2002) [hereinafter 2 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST]
(giving a detailed analysis of joint ventures and an analysis of European antitrust
regulation of intellectual property regimes). See generally Howard H. Chang et al.,
Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards Joint Ventures, 1998
COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 223; Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Why the EU Should
Not Adopt the American Efficiency Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures,
44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 871 (2000); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and
Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Joint
Ventures]; Symposium, Antitrust Scrutiny of Joint Ventures, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 641
(1998). For a detailed discussion of antitrust analysis of mergers, see Balto &
Mongoven, supra note 40 (giving an analysis of antitrust enforcement in the
pharmaceutical industry). See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY ch. 5 (2002)
(discussing American antitrust law of mergers); 1 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST,
supra note 19, §§ 14, 20 and 2 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST, supra § 45
(discussing horizontal merger analysis, vertical merger analysis, and European
analysis of mergers in an intellectual property context); Biggers et al., supra note
41, at 225-66 (comparing the evolution of intellectual property and antitrust
enforcement on in the European Union and United States); Sarah Stevens, The
Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in Extraterritorial Enforcement of the
Merger Regulation and Its Impact on Transatlantic Cooperation in Antitrust, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263 (2002) (examining the causes and implications of
the trend towards aggressive enforcement of extraterritorial merger control by the
European Commission).
78 Robert Pitofsky, An Antitrust Progress Report for the FTC: Past, Present
and Future, Remarks at the Antitrust 1996 Conference (Mar. 4, 1996), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/speech4.htm.
79 See Biggers at al., supra note 41, at 215-21 (arguing the need for American
and European regulators to cooperate in antitrust enforcement to reduce
inefficiency as economic globalization continues).
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The climate and cooperation of American and European antitrust
agencies is evolving, and there have been three recent
developments bringing American and European regulators
together.8
0
First, American and European antitrust agencies have
collaborated since the "revival" of the European Union-United
States Antitrust Cooperation Agreement of 1991 ("Agreement"). 81
Although the Agreement prohibits the transfer of confidential
information to outside agencies without the consent of the business
under review, it still has utility.82 A recent Microsoft case 83 is an
example of the benefit of this Agreement since the resulting
consent agreements that Microsoft entered into with the United
States and Europe were very similar.84
Second, the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
("IAEAA") helped to create a collaborative front between the
transatlantic agencies. 85 The IAEAA mandates the FTC and
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to complete bilateral agreements
80 See id., at 215-25 (discussing the three developments in United States and
European Union antitrust relations).
81 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1491; see also Biggers et al.,
supra note 41, at 216-19 (discussing the Agreement and its ramifications); Brian
Peck, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-EU
Dispute Over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity to Conflict? An
Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust Enforcement and Dispute
Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163, 1167-70 (1998) (explaining how the U.S./EC
Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation and Coordination did not lead to
cooperation as intended).
82 The utility of the Agreement is that it helps antitrust regulators on both
sides of the Atlantic coordinate efforts and limit conflicting antitrust
requirements. See Biggers et al., supra note 41, at 216-21 (discussing statements
made by FTC Commissioner Roscoe Starek and the European Commission
regarding the usefulness of the EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement of 1991,
despite the proscriptions on exchange of confidential information).
83 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
84 Both in the United States and the EU, Microsoft's competitors lodged
complaints about their licensing restrictions .... They argued these
restrictions foreclosed the market to competitors. In order to promulgate
a consistent, expedient conclusion to the dual investigations, Microsoft
consented to the exchange of information between the European
Commission and the DOJ and entered into trilateral talks that resulted in
consent decrees on identical terms.
Biggers et al., supra note 41, at 218.
85 Id. at 219-21.
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with foreign antitrust agencies to exchange confidential
information in certain circumstances.
86
Third, in 1995, the DOJ and FTC issued revised antitrust
guidelines regarding international operations ("International
Guidelines") that were "intended to provide antitrust guidance to
businesses engaged in international operations on questions that
relate specifically to the Agencies' international enforcement
policy." 87 The International Guidelines give explanations of U.S.
antitrust policy, the Agencies' jurisdiction over conduct and
business outside of the United States, and "mutual assistance in
international antitrust enforcement .... "88 The International
Guidelines reinforce the notion that an international collaborative
effort is necessary.89
5.2. U.S. Analysis of Intellectual Property and Antitrust
While the FTC and DOJ International Guidelines established
the jurisdictional boundaries of and potential collaborations with
international antitrust agencies, on the following day the FTC and
DOJ issued the "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property - 1995" ("IP Guidelines"). 90
The IP Guidelines were drafted to assist firms' ability to predict
whether antitrust regulators will challenge practices as being
anticompetitive. 91 The IP Guidelines are intended for internal use
and are based on three principles taken from the earlier 1988
Guidelines: (1) for the purposes of antitrust analysis, the Agencies
regard intellectual property the same as any other form of
property; (2) the Agencies do not presume that intellectual
property creates market power; and (3) the Agencies acknowledge
that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine
complementary factors of production, resulting in procompetitive
benefits.92
86 Id. at 219.
87 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,107 (1995)
[hereinafter International Guidelines], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr
/public/guidelines/internat.htm.
88 Id.§1.
89 See generally id. (promulgating antitrust enforcement guidelines for
international operations).
90 IP Guidelines, supra note 56.
91 Id.
92 Id. § 2.0.
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5.2.1. American Analysis of Patent Pools Using IP Guidelines
Patent pools are an effective mechanism to alleviate transaction
costs in the biopharmaceutical industry and will undergo antitrust
scrutiny for collusive anticompetitive effects. Therefore, antitrust
agencies' assessments of the lawfulness of such measures must be
considered.
After the IP Guidelines were issued, the FTC and DOJ assessed
the lawfulness of various patent pools. 93 All proposed patent pools
are reviewed by antitrust regulators and may provide the
following procompetitive characteristics: (1) integration of
complementary technologies; (2) reduction of transaction costs; (3)
clearing of blocking positions; (4) avoidance of expensive
infringement litigation; and (5) promotion of the dissemination of
technology. 94
Regulators consider the following patent pool characteristics
anticompetitive: (1) excluded firms from the patent pool cannot
compete in the goods market for the good incorporating the
licensed technologies; (2) the pool participants collectively possess
market power in the relevant market; and (3) any limitations on
participation are not reasonable to the efficient development of the
patent pool.95
93 See, e.g., In re Summit Tech., Inc., FTC Docket No. 9286 (Mar. 24, 1998)
(complaint) [hereinafter Summit Technology Complaint] (alleging the pooling of
patents of VISX, Inc. and Summit Technology Inc. violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act); see also Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
DOJ, Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (June
26, 1997) [hereinafter Klein (June 26, 1997)], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/busreview/1170.htm (examining the pooling arrangement of MPEG-2
patents and deciding against the initiation of antitrust enforcement action); Letter
from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ, Antitrust Division, to Gerrard
R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Klein (Dec. 16,
1998)] (examining the pooling arrangement of DVD and DVD player patents and
deciding against the initiation of antitrust enforcement action), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview /2121.htm.
94 IP Guidelines, supra note 56, § 5.5. The Justice Department has, however,
applied additional conditions in considering the approval of patent pools: (1) the
patents in the pool must be valid and unexpired; (2) there cannot be an
aggregation of competitive technologies, and there cannot be a set single price for
them; (3) an independent expert should be consulted to determine whether a
patent is essential to the pool; (4) the patent pool must not disadvantage
downstream product markets; and (5) the participants in the pool may not collude
on prices of products outside of the pool. See USPTO, supra note 41, at 7 (citing
Klein (June 26, 1997), supra note 93).
95 IP Guidelines, supra note 56, § 5.5, at 105-06.
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While the IP Guidelines recognize the procompetitive benefits
of patent pools, 96 there are four patent pool licensing schemes that
will be reviewed for antitrust violations:
1) collective price or output restraints in pooling
arrangements that do not contribute to an efficient
integration of economic activity; 2) settlement agreements
that combine intellectual property assets of horizontal
competitors and that have the effect of diminishing
competition; 3) exclusion of competitors from a patent pool
when the excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the
relevant market, and when the pool participants
collectively possess market power; and, 4) pooling
arrangements that deter research and development.
97
Today, the patent pool licensing analysis is broken down into
the following two questions: "(1) 'whether the proposed licensing
program is likely to integrate complementary patent rights,' and
(2) 'if so, whether the resulting competitive benefits are likely to be
outweighed by competitive harm posed by other aspects of the
program."'
98
The Justice Department has set forth the following additional
guidelines regarding patent pools:
(1) the patents in the pools must be valid and unexpired; (2)
the pool may not aggregate competitive technologies nor
create a single price for them; (3) an independent expert
should be enlisted to determine whether a patent is
essential to the pool and complements the technologies of
the pool; (4) the patent pool agreement must not
disadvantage competitors in downstream markets; and (5)
the pool members must not engage in price collusion of
96 Id.
97 Carlson, supra note 51, at 377-78 (footnotes omitted) (citing to IP
Guidelines, supra note 56, § 5.5, at 105-06).
98 USPTO, supra note 41, at 7 (quoting Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant
Attorney General, DOJ, Antitrust Division, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/busreview/2485.htm).
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goods outside the pool.99
Although American antitrust regulators have created a very
difficult path, if a group of firms demonstrates a procompetitive
benefit such as the removal of blocking patents (prevalent in the
biotechnology industry), avoids the four pitfalls, and ensures that
the members of the pool are contributing only'blocking patents
and not competing patents, then the FTC and DOJ should look
favorably upon the pool.100  Therefore, if the biotechnology
industry carefully creates a patent pool that limits transaction costs
and increases efficiencies, the American antitrust regulators will
likely approve it.
5.3. European Analysis of Intellectual Property and Antitrust
On April 1, 1996, the European Union issued "Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology
Transfer Agreements" ("Regulation 240/96").101 Regulation
240/96 is intended to increase innovation and disperse technology
within the EU more quickly.102 The Regulation created a bright
line rule that lists practices unlikely to create anticompetitive
effects, and also lists practices that will likely be challenged.103
Although Regulation 240/96 only covers two-party
agreements, Article 5 of the Regulation outlines additional
restrictions regarding patent pools, joint ventures, competitor
cross-licensing, and non-patent intellectual property sales
agreements.104
99 USPTO, supra note 41, at 7 (citing Klein (June 26, 1997), supra note 93).
100 Carlson, supra note 51, at 377-99 (explaining antitrust agency analysis of
patent pool formation).
101 Commission Regulation 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer
Agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2 [hereinafter Regulation 240/96].
102 Biggers et al., supra note 41, at 230.
103 The category of practices that will likely be challenged include: (1) direct
or indirect price restrictions; (2) territorial restrictions exceeding permissible
duration; (3) customer allocation by competitors in the same technological field of
use or the same product market; (4) output restrictions, unless they are pursuant
to a certain "use license"; (5) non-compete agreements and obligations; and (6)
grant-backs. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 77, at 1125.
104 Regulation 240/96, supra note 101, art. 5.
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5.3.1. European Analysis of Patent Pools
While there are differences from their American counterparts,
European antitrust regulators will primarily analyze patent pools
in the same way as American regulators.1 5 A major difference
between European and American patent pool approval is that
European regulators will likely require that patent pools offer a
compulsory licensing scheme, even if the pool is not overtly
restrictive. 106 If a third party attempts to acquire a license from a
patent pool, there are three circumstances in which a compulsory
license may be compelled: (1) if the intellectual property right
holder is a member of a standard setting organization or patent
pool and "readiness to license" is necessary to get past the Treaty
Establishing the European Community's Article 81(3)'s107 antitrust
requirements; (2) if the intellectual property right holder is a
member of a standard setting organization or patent pool and "the
readiness to license is a condition for exemption [from antitrust
violations] of a de facto standards arrangements between jointly
dominant firms, even in the absence of any restrictive provisions;"
and (3) if there are exceptional circumstances under Article 82,
both patent pool members and non-members may be compelled to
license should there be an abuse of dominance.10
8
Despite the procompetitive benefits of patent pools, European
regulators will likely require the pool members to grant licenses to
third parties. 09 This intuitively makes sense since the economic
justification of patent pools is that they create a single entity,
instead of many self-interested entities, from which a third party
may obtain a license.
105 See generally Maurits Dolmans, Standards for Standards, 26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 163 (2002) (discussing the application of European competition law to
standardization activities).
106 Id. at 192-99.
107 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3 (1997).
108 Dolmans, supra note 105, at 192-93.
109 European regulators see pools as an accumulation of market power, and
any practices that abuse this dominant position will be inherently suspect.
Therefore, EU regulators will require the pools to offer reasonably priced licenses.
Id. at 193-95.
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5.4. Summary
Patent pools are a likely solution to alleviate the high
transaction costs in the biopharmaceutical industry, but will
undergo antitrust scrutiny in the United States and Europe.
Although both the United States and European antitrust regulators
analyze patent pools under similar rubrics, the big difference in the
analysis is that European regulators will likely require a
compulsory licensing scheme. The compulsory licensing
requirement in both Europe and the United States is further
detailed in the next Section.
6. COMPULSORY LICENSING AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In Europe and the United States, the general rule is that a firm
may unilaterally refuse to license to competitors, although this rule
has recently been eroding.110
110 Even if a firm acts unilaterally, it may nonetheless be compelled to offer
licenses to its competitors. See John M. Taladay & James N. Carlin, Jr., Compulsory
Licensing of Intellectual Property Under the Competition Laws of the United States and
European Community, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 443, 445-50 (2002) (discussing two
different approaches regarding compulsory licensing). In the United States, there
is a circuit split regarding the issue of court compelled licensing schemes.
Compare Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding Kodak in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act for
attempting to monopolize the service market for copiers and compelling Kodak to
sell servicing parts to Independent Service Operators), with CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox
Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that "Xerox was under no
obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws
by refusing to do so"). The split has led to an academic debate and raised the
issue of forum-shopping. See Peter M. Boyle et al., Antitrust Law at the Federal
Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
739, 751 (2001) ("[T]he clear, overarching message from Xerox is that intellectual
property rights trump the antitrust laws if a conflict arises between them."); Scott
A. Stempel & John F. Terzaken III, Casting a Long IP Shadow Over Antitrust
Jurisprudence: The Federal Circuit's Expanding Jurisdictional Reach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
711, 731-33, 737-38 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is expanding its
antitrust jurisprudence regarding intellectual property issues and potential
plaintiffs will compose well-pleaded complaints, ensuring no intellectual property
issue is involved to have the case heard in a regional court); Taladay & Carlin,
supra, at 449-50 (discussing the circuit split and the resulting uncertainty). Note,
there is an entirely different doctrine known as the "essential facilities" doctrine.
The essential facilities doctrine requires compulsory licensing if a holder of an
input or factor of production commands market power over another market. See
Taladay & Carlin, supra, at 450-51 ("The essential facilities doctrine is a specific
type of refusal to deal characterized by a monopolists' control of an essential
facility, or bottleneck, that can extend monopoly power from one stage of
production to another or from one market to another."). In the biotechnology
context, the essential facilities doctrine has resulted in academic proposals of a
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/6
2004] ANTITRUST AND GENE THERAPY 407
But, if multiple firms collectively refuse to license as they seek
vertical integration, then American and European antitrust
agencies will review the actions for anticompetitive effects. In the
antitrust review, the agencies may require the new entity to offer
reasonably priced licenses to third parties. This is especially true
when the agencies approve a patent pool."'
6.1. Patent Pools and Compulsory Licensing
Patent pools often negotiate terms and requirements with
antitrust agencies ex ante to preempt regulators from filing
antitrust actions ex post.1" 2 One of these requirements is that "the
[patent] pool agreement must not disadvantage competitors in
downstream product markets." 113 If the patent pool consists of an
accumulation of upstream or undeveloped technology, then it will,
by definition, affect a downstream market. So, antitrust regulators
formal compulsory licensing scheme, irrespective of the type of input for DNA
sequences and avoiding the need for vertical integration.
Congress ought to enact a compulsory-licensing statute and an
experimental-use exemption. A compulsory-licensing scheme, with fees
set on a sliding scale depending upon the commercial value of the
invention, would ensure royalties for inventors while allowing further
research on the patented DNA sequences. In addition, an experimental-
use exemption would promote innovation by protecting from
infringement liability public-sector and nonprofit scientists engaged in
noncommercial research.
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1691 (2001). European courts and
regulators also compel licenses. See Taladay & Carlin, supra, at 450 ("European
courts and regulators are prepared to compel a firm to grant access to its IP, even
where the firm has not engaged in a past course of conduct to license such
property. One underlying feature of these decisions is the EC's reliance on the
essential facilities doctrine."). See, e.g., Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P,
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743 (finding that the primary
broadcasting companies in the UK and Ireland abused their dominant market
positions by refusing to license copyrighted material); Case T-184/01 R, IMS
Health v. Commission, 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 3247 (Ct. First Instance Oct. 26,
2001) (holding that IMS had violated Article 82 in refusing to license its database
system to competitors).
111 See supra Section 4 (discussing the alleviation of high transaction costs via
vertical integration).
112 See supra note 94 and accompanying text regarding the characteristics of
patent pools.
113 USPTO, supra note 41, at 7 (citing Klein (June 26, 1997), supra note 93).
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will often require such patent pools to grant licenses with
reasonable royalty schemes.114
Generally, patent pools must grant licenses to third parties that
contain reasonable terms on a nondiscriminatory basis.115 But, the
reasonableness of a license is disputable. Regardless, many patent
pools are created to provide "one stop shopping" for those seeking
to license from multiple patent holders.116
6.2. Mergers and Compulsory Licensing
Merger approval often results in an agency issuing a consent
order to offer a compulsory licensing scheme.
An example of a merger where American agencies mandated a
compulsory licensing scheme was the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
merger in 1997. In analyzing the merger for potential
anticompetitive effects, the FTC required Novartis, the surviving
company, to offer nondiscriminatory licenses of its gene therapy
patents.117
The merger involved a $63 billion horizontal combination of
two large pharmaceutical companies and would create the firm
Novartis." 8 The FTC felt it threatened to create a monopoly 1 9 in
key technologies used in the development of gene therapy
products for cancer and AIDS.120 Although gene therapy
treatments are promising, both Ciba-Geigy' 2' and Sandoz were
114 See Rai, supra note 12, at 846 (citing Klein (June 26, 1997), and Klein (Dec.
16, 1998), supra note 93). Many firms may claim to offer fair licenses, but they may
carry unreasonable conditions such as high royalty rates. A patent holder may
generally create a royalty rate at whatever the market will bear, but courts have
found antitrust violations when the patent holder attempts to use the royalties as
a "device for leveraging additional profits from unlicensed products." HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUsT POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 244 (2d ed. 1999).
115 See Rai, supra note 12, at 846.
116 Shapiro, supra note 27, at 134.
117 In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842, 873-77 (1997).
118 Id. at 844; see also William J. Baer & David A. Balto, New Myths and Old
Realities: Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
207, 222-23 (1999) (discussing the FTC's innovation market analysis of the Ciba-
Geigy/Sandoz merger).
119 In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 851 (citing to § 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2003), and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2003)).
120 Id. at 845.
121 Ciba-Geigy did not itself own gene therapy patents, but rather was the
largest shareholder in Chiron, which held these patents. As of 1996, when this
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only in development stages of treatments and no such products
had yet been approved by the FDA. 122 In addition, there were
"relatively few potential competitors for this technology because
the merging firms controlled critical patents." 123 The rationale was
that the merger would reduce incentives to develop competing
products in the potential gene therapy markets.124
The FTC issued a consent order requiring the new entity to
license certain technology and patent rights to Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, making certain that it can compete with the merged firm in
the R&D market.125 The FTC further ordered "that the merged firm
license specific patents of Ciba and Sandoz to any interested
person at a reasonable royalty." 126 The antitrust analysis of the
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger in the United States and Europe is
discussed in further detail in Section 7.
Many corporations dependant on intellectual property may
undergo antitrust scrutiny if they are undertaking a consolidation
or if a suit is brought against them. While cooperating with
regulators, they will have to consider both American and European
antitrust laws if there are global issues.127 If Europe has a more
stringent compulsory licensing standard or requires it more
frequently, then its regulations may well become the international
standard due to the globalization of the biopharmaceutical
industry.
action began, Ciba-Geigy owned 46.5 percent of Chiron capital stock, funded
Chiron research, had the right to appoint members of the Chiron board of
directors, and had the right to veto Chiron's actions. See In re Ciba-Geigy, 123
F.T.C. at 852.
122 See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King At the Antitrust
Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43,
55-58 (2001) (analyzing the Commission's decision in the Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz
merger).
123 Baer & Balto, supra note 118, at 222.
124 Id.
125 The FTC ensured that Rhone-Poulenc Rorer could continue developing its
HSV-tk gene therapy products for cancer and graft versus host disease. See In re
Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 873-74.
126 Separate Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet
D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek, III, and Christine A. Varney, In re Ciba-Geigy, 123
F.T.C. at 897.
127 See Taladay & Carlin, Jr., supra note 110, at 457 (concluding that "[t]he
different approaches taken by U.S. and EC courts require practitioners to consider
a variety of factors in weighing the risks of licensing practices").
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7. ANTITRUST AGENCIES AND INNOVATION MARKET ANALYSIS
A relatively new and controversial 28 development in antitrust
analysis is the scrutiny of innovation markets.1 29 According to the
DOJ and FTC, an innovation market "consists of the research and
development directed to particular new or improved goods or
processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development."130  Innovation market analysis is applicable to
mergers, joint ventures, or other forms of intellectual property
licensing.131 Before a consumer or excluded rival may allege
anticompetitive conduct in an innovation market, they must
overcome the hurdle of demonstrating standing, which includes
proof of an injury and causation; therefore most innovation market
challenges come from antitrust agencies. 32 This standing issue is
not applicable to governmental agencies.
7.1. Innovation Market Analysis of the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Merger
Both EU and American antitrust regulators approved the Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz merger in 1997. While the American antitrust
regulators analyzed the merger through an innovation market lens,
128 This concept is controversial in part because it deals with a research
'product' that has yet to - and may never - come to market and whose
price and value are therefore difficult to establish, and in part because it
is uncertain whether the analysis can successfully capture all of the
locations where relevant research may be occurring.
Michael S. Jacobs, Lessons From the Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation: Indirect
Purchasers, Antitrust Standing, and Antitrust Federalism, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 59, 59
n.2 (1998) (citing to Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63
ANTrRUsT L.J. 621 (1995) and Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine,
Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation
Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1995)). See generally Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C.
Sunshine, The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp, and Hoerner, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 78-80 (1995) (discussing the existence of an innovation market
under section 7); Robert J. Hoerner, Innovation Markets: New Wine in Old Bottles?,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50-55 (1995) (contending that innovation is not a "line of
commerce" for section 7 analysis purposes); Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of
the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRusT L.J. 19, 20-22 (1995)
(describing the origins and early applications of innovation market analysis).
129 Baer & Balto, supra note 118, at 221.
130 IP Guidelines, supra note 56, § 3.2.3.
131 Id. (using examples to demonstrate the antitrust analysis).
132 See 1 HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 19, § 4.3d n.30 (citing to
Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 86 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Mich. 2000) as an example where
the owner of a Ford automobile did not have standing to challenge an alleged
agreement by automobile manufacturers to produce fuel inefficient cars).
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the European regulators reviewed it in a future markets context.33
Despite using different analytical frameworks, both agencies
ultimately approved the merger with the condition that the
resulting company, Novartis, offer compulsory, reasonably priced,
non-exclusive licenses to third party developers of gene therapies.
7.1.1. European Analysis of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Merger
In conducting an analysis of the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
merger, the European Commission did not attempt to classify its
investigation as an innovation market analysis. The regulators
instead looked at the "future market" of goods for gene therapy
products. 134
As the European Commission analyzed the future gene therapy
market, they realized that there were too many "uncertainties
surrounding any future product market," and "there was not a
sufficient probability that the merger would lead to the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position."135  Without definitive
evidence of a dominant position, the Commission held that the
merger did not inhibit competition. But, it can be argued that the
Commission came to its result because the parties had already
accepted that Novartis would allow Chiron Corporation to issue
non-exclusive licenses for gene therapy in the European Union. 136
Fortunately, the European Commission did not feign an
innovation market analysis. It simply conducted a future market
analysis and determined that an open licensing scheme would
prevent any concentration of the R&D market for gene therapy
treatments.
133 See Lawrence B. Landman, Did Congress Actually Create Innovation
Markets?, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 758-60 (1998) (outlining the similarities
between the European Commission decisions and the American agencies
decisions); Thomas B. Marcotullio, The Battle Against Drug-Makers: An Analysis of
European Union and United States Merger Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry
1995-1999, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 449, 478-82 (2001) (analyzing the
international response to the Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz merger and noting the
"congruity between the authorities' analysis, particularly in the choice of markets
and the remedies imposed").
134 Commission Decision 97/469 on Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, 1997 O.J. (L 201) 1
[hereinafter Ciba EU decision].
135 Marcotullio, supra note 133, at 478-79 (citing the Ciba EU decision and
analyzing the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger).
136 See Marcotullio, supra note 133, at 479 ("Knowing it could rely on these
provisions, the Commission may have felt more comfortable in finding that there
was no competitive harm.").
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7.1.2. U.S. Analysis of the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz Merger
The FTC claimed to have conducted an innovation market
analysis of the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger.1 37 The FTC alleged
that the merger would result in harm to competition in a broad
gene therapy R&D market,138 and four specific gene therapy future
goods markets: (1) herpes simplex virus-thymidine kinase ("HSV-
tk") gene therapy for the treatment of cancer; (2) HSV-tk gene
therapy for the treatment of graft versus host disease; (3) gene
therapy for the treatment of hemophilia; and (4) chemoresistance
gene therapy.1 39
The FTC admitted that the earliest a gene therapy product
could be sold was 2000, and that regulatory agencies would not
allow entry into the markets before then.l4° But, once the first gene
therapy treatment is introduced into the market, the FTC felt the
market for gene therapy treatments would grow significantly.141
In this case, instead of performing an innovation market
analysis, the FTC conducted a future goods market analysis,
evidenced by the specific markets it had identified. The FTC
admitted that the gene therapy development efforts by Novartis
would eventually result in efforts to manufacture and sell
treatments. The FTC was not only analyzing the R&D efforts of the
parties, but also Novartis' potential ability to sell goods. 142 In the
end, the FTC alleged the merger would harm competition, not in
an R&D (innovation) market, but rather in the future gene therapy
treatment (future goods) market.143
The FTC recognized that it could not predict which patents
Novartis would hold, yet it somehow concluded that the firm
could use its intellectual property to create barriers to entry in the
137 See In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. 842, 844-46.
138 The FTC estimates that the yet-to-be developed market will have an
annual value of $45 billion by the year 2010. Id. at 845.
139 Landman, supra note 133, at 788; In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 844-45.
140 See In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 850 ("The most significant barriers to
entry include technical, regulatory, patent, clinical and production barriers. The
FDA must approve all phases of gene therapy development, including extensive
preclinical and clinical work."); see also Landman, supra note 133, at 788 ("The FTC
did not expect the regulatory authorities to allow firms to sell any gene therapy
products until the year 2000 ... ").
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gene therapy market.44 Although a refusal to license is not usually
an antitrust violation,145 the FTC was concerned that Novartis
would refuse to license its gene therapy patents in hopes of
garnering a monopoly position. 46 Therefore, the FTC ordered the
parties to offer non-exclusive licenses of essential gene therapy
intellectual property. 147 But the FTC did not need, nor did it
conduct, an innovation market analysis to require the open
licensing scheme.14
7.2. Summary
Using the claimed innovation market analysis, the FTC ordered
the parties to grant non-exclusive licenses to third parties for its
gene therapy intellectual properties. This compulsory licensing
scheme convinced the European regulators to cease further inquiry
into the matter. The result is that Novartis, which held four
primary upstream patents on gene therapy research, must open the
market to its competitors seeking licenses.
European regulators are comfortable ordering compulsory
licenses under specific conditions. The United States, on the other
hand, allows its antitrust agencies to order licenses in exchange for
merger and patent pool approvals and the courts to order
compulsory licensing. 49  Despite the inconsistencies, most
businesses should be concerned with the antitrust authorities
because they enforce the laws, whereas the court system may be
susceptible to some degree of forum shopping.
144 Id. at 789.
145 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
146 See Landman, supra note 133, at 789 (noting that "Novartis would lead the
gene therapy R&D effort, and, the FTC reasoned, would not want other firms to
close the R&D gap").
147 In re Ciba-Geigy, 123 F.T.C. at 873; see also Baer & Balto, supra note 118, at
223 ("Competitors already had (to varying degrees) the hard assets, e.g.,
production facilities, researchers and scientists, needed to compete. Rivals and
other scientists confirmed that licensing would enable them to develop gene
therapy products and replace the competition lost due to the merger.").
148 Landman, supra note 133, at 789-90.
149 See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195,
1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Kodak violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act for attempting to monopolize the service market for copiers and compelled
Kodak to sell servicing parts to Independent Service Operators).
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8. INCREASED COMPETITION MAY BE HARMFUL TO CURRENT GENE
THERAPY PATIENTS
8.1. Gene Therapy
The gene therapy industry is a subset of the biopharmaceutical
industry and therefore, encounters the same high transaction costs.
As the gene therapy industry attempts to alleviate these
transaction costs through vertical integrations, it will undergo
antitrust scrutiny, as was seen in the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
merger discussed in Section 7.1. Antitrust regulators will likely
require a compulsory licensing scheme as was demonstrated in the
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger. As these vertically integrated
companies and their competitors increase the number of gene
therapy trials, compulsory licensing and scientific failures may
have an adverse impact on R&D of gene therapies and the patients
who need them.
8.2. Gene Therapy Trials Increasing
The licensing scheme expressly mandated by the FTC and
implicitly by the European Commission in its approval of the Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz merger, which requires reasonably priced, non-
exclusive licenses, will undoubtedly increase the number of gene
therapy research experiments. Because of the ease in obtaining
upstream patent rights, many more gene therapy experiments may
potentially be undertaken, and the fear is that, at some point, gene
therapy experiments will go wrong or fail.150 If the failure is in the
form of inflicting patients with additional illnesses or even death,
all gene therapy trials will likely be halted by regulators. If this
occurs, it will have disastrous effects on current patients awaiting
potential lifesaving gene therapies.
150 Additional experiments do not necessarily have a higher likelihood of
success or failure (holding each individual experiment's probability of success
constant). But, if there are more total gene therapy experiments (with the same
probability of success/failure) being tested on humans, then there is a higher
likelihood that at least one of the experiments will fail according to the law of
large numbers. The law of large numbers says that if a series of events occurs
many times, there is a higher likelihood that the actual number of occurrences will
be equal to the probability. See IRVING ADLER, PROBABILITY AND STATISTIcS FOR
EVERYMAN 188-90 (1963) (discussing probabilities for long run frequencies). For
example, if an event has a probability of 1:100, and if the experiment is conducted
1000 times, then there will likely be ten occurrences of the event. Id.
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8.3. Gene Therapy Trials Halted
In the United States, the FDA and National Institute of Health
("NIH") regulate gene therapies. The FDA oversees the
development of novel drugs including biologics-based products,151
such as gene therapies, 152 by its Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research ("CBER").53 The NIH, although not a formal regulatory
agency, has established the Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee ("RAC"), 154 which also oversees gene therapy research
on human subjects. 155
Gene therapy products cannot be sold unless they pass three
phases of human clinical trials. 156 As trials are conducted, the FDA
may halt experiments if they are unsafe. Since January 2000, the
FDA has halted many gene therapy trials creating an ongoing
debate as to the resulting effects on gene therapy patients.
On September 17, 2000, Jesse Gelsinger, eighteen years of age,
died at the University of Pennsylvania Hospital while undergoing
a gene therapy treatment. 5 7 Mr. Gelsinger died of multiple organ
failure caused by a severe immune reaction to his gene therapy
treatment designed to correct a metabolic problem with his liver. 58
Because Mr. Gelsinger's condition had been kept in check before
151 A biologic-based product is a drug or chemical that is derived from a
living source, as opposed to being chemically synthesized.
152 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2003); see also Food and Drug Administration, Products
FDA Regulates, (listing biologics among the products regulated by the FDA), at
http://www.fda.gov (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
153 The FDA has authority to regulate and review the clinical research and
marketing of: drugs, biologics, food, food additives, medical devices, and animal
drugs under authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FFDCA")
and the Public Health Service Act ("PHSA"). 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2003). CBER has
authority to regulate biologics under section 351 of the PHSA and also from
specific sections of the FFDCA.
154 RAC was established by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (now Health and Human Services) and is now under the auspices of the
National Institute of Health ("NIH"). Joseph M. Rainsbury, Biotechnology on the
RAC - FDA/NIH Regulation of Human Gene Therapy, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 575, 576
(2000).
155 Id. at 580.
156 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2003).
157 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gene Therapy Ordered Halted At University, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting on FDA investigations of researcher conduct
associated with the death of Jesse Gelsinger).
158 Jesse Gelsinger had a mild form of ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency,
an inherited disorder in which the liver cannot process ammonia, a toxic
breakdown product of protein. Id. at A12.
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the gene therapy treatment through a restrictive diet and drugs, his
death created a large controversy. 159
After an investigation into Mr. Gelsinger's death, the FDA
placed a "clinical hold" on eight experiments, five of which had
active clinical trials in diseases ranging from cystic fibrosis to
breast cancer. 160 The investigators found that Mr. Gelsinger may
not have even been eligible for the trials. 161 The investigators also
found that all eighteen enrolled patients in the trials had not filled
out or signed eligibility forms. 162 Lastly, Mr. Gelsinger's family
was not informed that "one of the principal investigators held a
thirty percent equity position in Genovo, the biotechnology firm
supplying the viral vector - an equity interest that would
ultimately net the researcher over $ 13 million dollars when it was
sold to a larger firm."163 While Mr. Gelsinger's death has set the
gene therapy industry back many years, the FDA, RAC, and
academics are becoming increasingly concerned with researchers'
ethics and conflicts of interest in conducting human trials.164
159 Id. But, "[t]here is speculation that Gelsinger's prior exposure to the
human parvovirus rendered him peculiarly sensitive to the adenovirus [used in
his gene therapy]." Rainsbury, supra note 154, at 593 n.150.
160 Stolberg, supra note 157, at Al; see also Eliot Marshall, FDA Halts All Gene
Therapy Trials at Penn, SCIENCE, Jan. 28, 2000 at 565 (explaining that seven gene
therapy trials at the University of Pennsylvania were halted by the FDA).
161 Dr. James M. Wilson was the head researcher for the trials that resulted in
Jesse Gelsinger's death. See, e.g., Letter from the Department of Health and
Human Services, FDA, to Dr. James M. Wilson, Institute for Human Gene
Therapy (Nov. 30, 2000) (concluding that Wilson deliberately violated federal
regulations in regards to investigating new drugs), available at http://www.
fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/n121.pdf.
162 Stolberg, supra note 157, at A12.
163 Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible
Dreams and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 132 (2001).
164 There are increasingly large conflicts of interests between researchers and
patients. Researchers often have a considerable financial stake in the success of
the trials. This may lead them to underreport adverse results, sign up patients
without properly informing them of the risks of the experiment, skew data in
favor of desired results, or even manipulate the experimental design to obtain
favorable results. Id. at 138; see also Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for
Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L & MED. 253, 268 (2001) ("[Flinancial interest is seen as
undermining trial management and adverse event reporting, and thereby
impairing the safety system for protecting human subjects."); S. Van McCrary et
al., A National Survey of Policies on Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical
Research, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1624-25 (2000) (discussing the variations in
conflicts of interest at research institutions and suggesting that the current
standards of disclosure are inadequate to maintain a high level of scientific
integrity); Pilar N. Ossorio, Pills, Bills and Shills: Physician-Researcher's Conflicts of
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Then, on October 3, 2002, it was made public that a three year
old child who was successfully treated with gene therapy to cure
SCID, also known as "bubble baby syndrome," contracted a
disease similar to leukemia.165 The gene therapy treatments were
being conducted by Dr. Alain Fischer and his colleagues at the
Necker Children's Hospital in Paris.166 Although the child's
development of a cancer-like disease was made public in October,
similar gene therapy trials in France and three in the United States
had already been halted after Dr. Fischer's discovery.167 The FDA
had immediately placed a "clinical hold" on the three similar trials
underway in the United States when it learned of Dr. Fischer's
findings.16
8
Finally, on January 14, 2003, the FDA suspended 169 twenty-
seven gene therapy trials involving hundreds of patients after
discovering that a second child in France had contracted a
leukemia-like disease.170 Although of the eleven children being
treated for SCID there have been nine successes, the two failures
have raised concerns regarding the safety of the experiments.'71
In both SCID cases, the gene therapy involved the insertion of
the treatment into stem cells that landed on or near LMO-2, a
Interest, 8 WIDENER. L. SYMP. J. 75, 102 (2001) ("Concern over conflicts of interest in
biomedical research is growing as the financial and human subjects stakes
increase."); Liz Kowalczyk, New Steps Urged on University Research Bias, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2001, at Al, D6 ("[F]inancial bias could lead a university or
teaching hospital to slant a clinical trial in favor of a company's drug, or to
downplay negative side effects on patients.").
165 French researchers did not characterize the disease as leukemia but
instead described it as a "lymphoproliferation" or proliferation of uncontrollably
growing cells. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trials Are Halted on a Gene Therapy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at Al (reporting on the FDA's order to halt SCID gene therapy
trials).
166 Id. at A25.
167 Dr. Fischer notified the FDA, French authorities, and researchers in the
field of the proliferation of cells, "right after Labor Day, as soon as he knew the
problem was serious." Id.
168 Two experimental trials were being done at Children's Hospital in Los
Angeles, California, and the other was at the National Institute of Health Study in
Bethesda, Maryland. Id.
169 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Talk Paper, FDA Places Temporary
Halt on Gene Therapy Trials Using Retroviral Vectors in Blood Stem Cells, (Jan.
14, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01
190. html.
170 Andrew Pollack, FDA Halts 27 Gene Therapy Trials After Illness, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2003, at Al.
171 Id.
20041 417
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cancer-promoting gene, or oncogene. 172 Although the probability
of turning on the oncogene is 1 in 100,000, the fact that millions of
gene therapy cells are inserted into the patients increases the
probability that at least one cell landed on the oncogene 73 The
researchers were aware of this possibility, but in no human model
has a single activated oncogene alone caused cancer. 174
The most recent halt of twenty-seven gene therapy
experiments, which use retroviruses to insert DNA into blood stem
cells,175 is an example of how one failure can end all research in
that area. The current halt of experiments represents fifteen
percent of the approximately 200 gene therapy trials underway in
the United States.1
76
8.4. Antitrust Regulators' Impact on Gene Therapy Research
As the gene therapy industry vertically integrates to alleviate
high transaction costs, it will undergo antitrust scrutiny. If the
industry integrates via a merger or patent pool, antitrust regulation
will likely require it to offer reasonably priced licenses. What the
antitrust regulators have failed to consider is that there are large
conflicts of interest in the scientific community, 177 incentivizing
researchers to violate safety protocols.178  Any violations,
172 Andrew Pollack, 2nd Cancer Is Attributed to Gene Used in F.D.A. Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24.
173 Id. (quoting Dr. von Kalle, a scientist collaborating with the French
researchers).
174 Id.
175 Jennifer Warner, FDA Temporarily Halts Some Gene Trials: Action Comes
After French Child Develops Leukemia-like Condition, WebMD Health (Jan. 14, 2003),
at http://my.webmd.com/content/Article/59/66687.htm.
176 National Hemophilia Foundation, FDA Suspends 27 Gene Therapy Trials
After Second Child in France Falls II: Hemophilia Trials Not Affected (Jan. 21,
2003), at http://www.hemophilia.org/news/medicalnews/mn 01 21_03.htm.
177 See supra text accompanying note 164.
178 Although the FDA regulates gene therapy, it "do[es] not review research
proposals. Instead, the federal regulations delegate authority for the review,
approval, and monitoring of biomedical research studies to IRBs [institutional
review boards], which are committees designated by individual institutions."
Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional
Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 731 (2001). Federal
regulations govern IRBs as well as their safety protocols. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.101(a),
102(g) (2003) (establishing the scope and definition of IRBs); see also 21 C.F.R. §
56.111 (2003) (laying out the safety protocols and criteria for IRB approval); 45
C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (2003) (regulating that all departments or agencies that fund
research must ensure that the research passes through IRB review); 45 C.F.R. §
46.111 (2003) (listing criteria for IRB approval).
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irrespective of the potential scientific efficacy of the gene therapy
experiments, could lead to a halt on gene therapy trials, even those
of the original licensor. Not only does the halt on trials harm
licensors and licensees, but it also harms gene therapy patients. In
addition, the potential halts on gene therapy trials will limit future
incentives to innovate.
8.5. Proposed Solution79
Therefore, compulsory licensing is not the solution; original
licensors, even those firms that vertically integrate, must be able to
dictate the experimental design and protocols of licensees to limit
negative externalities. 80
If licensors were allowed to determine the experimental
designs and protocols used by their competitors/licensees, they
could limit the externalities that might occur if the licensee
attempted to circumvent safety protocols. For example, the
licensor could require that the licensee affirmatively demonstrate
informed consent from all patients, pre-approve experimental
design, and receive experimental results contemporaneously with
the FDA. These requirements would ensure that any experimental
impropriety of the licensee will be caught by the licensor. It will
also limit the possibility of a potential halt on gene therapy trials
being conducted by the licensor because of a failure of the licensee
to follow safety protocols.
The licensor has the greatest incentive to ensure that the
licensees follow all safety protocols. After all, licensees will be
conducting similar gene therapy research as the licensor and if any
misuse occurs resulting in an FDA halt on similar gene therapies,
then both the licensee and licensor will suffer.
One counterargument is that by allowing the licensor to
regulate the use of its license, antitrust regulators will be
179 Note, another concept that may be applied to this situation is the use of
pliability rules. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (discussing how pliability rules, having a dynamic
nature, "are contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with property
rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains;
however, once the relevant condition changes, a different rule protects the
entitlement -either liability or property, as the circumstances dictate").
180 The negative externality is that the licensees do not bear all the costs in
acquiring the license and instead, the cost is borne by the licensor if the FDA halts
all similar gene therapy trials; not because the potential gene therapy was not
scientifically viable, but rather because a licensee violated safety protocols.
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condoning anticompetitive conduct. Under the proposal offered
here, it can be argued that the licensor will only approve
competitors' experiments that offer potentially minimal profits or
experiments that do not conflict with its own research. However,
the licensor will not be given the power to deny experimental use,
but rather the power to offer modifications to the experimental
procedures proposed by licensees. In addition, an administrative
body, such as the FDA, may be given the authority to create a
committee to hear licensees' appeals of anticompetitive abuse by
licensors.lS1
Another counterargument is that the gene therapy trials have
been halted simply because there was no real scientific merit to the
experiments to begin with; that they failed, like other potential
therapies fail, while still in the clinical trial phase. However, gene
therapy trials have been halted not for failure to demonstrate
scientific efficacy, but rather for failure to follow safety procedures,
as in the Gelsinger case.182  The safety failures range from
underreporting adverse data and failing to inform patients of
potential experimental risks to skewing the experimental design to
achieve favorable results or skewing experimental data
altogether. 183 Because there are conflicts of interest, as seen in the
Gelsinger case, resulting in his untimely death and a halt on all
similar gene therapy trials, it is short-sighted to say that these gene
therapy trials failed simply because they had no scientific merit.
9. CONCLUSION
The gene therapy industry faces the same high transaction cost
problems that plague the biopharmaceutical industry. Given the
structural problems associated with the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries, there is clearly a movement towards
vertical integration. In response, antitrust regulators will evaluate
any resulting anticompetitive effects from vertically integrating
transactions, and will likely require a compulsory licensing
scheme, as exemplified by the Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz merger. But
181 In addition, a procedure would have to be created that would guide the
interim research rights and protocols while the appeals are heard.
182 It can be argued that the gene therapy trials were halted after Jesse
Gelsinger's death. But his death would not have occurred had the researchers
followed the proper safety protocols.
183 See Kuszler, supra note 163, at 135-40 (discussing financial and non-
financial conflicts of interest).
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there is a flaw in their analysis: antitrust regulators know, ex ante,
that there are large conflicts of interest in the scientific community
which incentivizes researchers to circumvent safety protocols.
Oftentimes, these safety protocol evasions have led to patient
harm, which resulted in a FDA halt of all similar gene therapy
trials.
If a potential competitor acquiring a reasonably priced license
from a newly merged firm, such as Novartis, begins gene therapy
trials on similar research paths, and then commits serious failures
because of its attempts to bypass safety protocols such that the
FDA suspends all similar research trials, the licensor is unjustly
harmed. None of these competitors would exist but for the
compulsory licensing requirement. These externalities associated
with failing to follow safety procedures will be unjustly borne by
the licensor, Novartis, as well as gene therapy patients. Gene
therapy patients awaiting the treatments will be left with no
alternatives. Thus, the compulsory license required by antitrust
regulators may actually harm patients needing experimental gene
therapies.
Therefore, to mitigate the externalities borne by licensors
compelled to offer reasonably priced licenses to their competitors,
licensors should be permitted to screen experimental protocols of
their licensees and monitor licensees' research trials. Should the
licensors abuse their pre-approval privileges, an FDA review
committee could be created to consider licensees' appeals. This
proposal would maintain incentives to innovate within the
biotechnology industry, permit antitrust review of vertically
integrative transactions to limit monopoly concentrations, and
limit harm to gene therapy patients while still maximizing the
benefit that they may potentially receive.
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